From a cable sent this past February, published on WikiLeaks.org along with thousands of other classified State Department communication cables. Long live the Internet instagram android!
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248 SUBJECT: A/S CAMPBELL DISCUSSES DPRK FUTURE WITH EXPERTS
Discussion Summary: A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on North Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was difficult to predict whether Kim Jong-il’s youngest son Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his father without sparking instability in the North musiktitel kostenlosen. Of the five experts, one thought the younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of leadership experience made it unlikely he would win the support of the ruling elites microsoft office windows 7 kostenlosen vollversion deutsch. They agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him herunterladen. Kim Jong-il had used draconian controls and international aid to discourage coups after having foiled three such attempts in the late 90s. China’s strategic interests were fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea download the settlers 7. End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt
Discussion Highlights: [...] The experts agreed that regime succession was fully underway and that the North Korean people had accepted the process pdf dateien auf ipad herunterladen. [...] The group agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law and right-hand man Jang Song-taek was spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for power once Kim Jong-un’s father died, but the group was split on the younger Kim’s prospects for holding onto power tomcat 8 herunterladen. XXXX suggested it was unclearwhether Jang would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the curtain, or would challenge him directly for outright control herunterladen. [...] XXXX recalled the tumultuous state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President Park Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would be “100 times more troublesome.” [...] XXXX opined that brutal repression and international aid had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il’s ability to fend off challenges musik kostenlos auf pc deutsch. After three separate coup attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by executing anyone who had been even remotely involved in the plots wie kann man videos von youtube legal herunterladen. [...] The large-scale assistance provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S., Japan and others had been intended in part to avoid a hard landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat, he said. XXXX suggested that North Korea had skillfully played Washington and Beijing off one another. [...] The experts agreed that China’s obsession with DPRK stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds with U.S. and ROK interests. Given a choice between reaching out to Seoul or Beijing, XXXX believed that Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support [...] the U.S. stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by virtue of its proximity to the North. [...] Beijing was concerned about [...] a potential flood of “economic migrants” and broader social unrest on its immediate border.