Formally Confidential Talks about North Korea’s Future

From a cable sent this past February, published on along with thousands of other classified State Department communication cables. Long live the Internet instagram android!

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000248

Discussion Summary: A group of five ROK opinion leaders and experts on North
Korea issues told A/S Kurt Campbell on February 3 it was difficult to predict
whether Kim Jong-il’s youngest son Kim Jong-un would be able to succeed his
father without sparking instability in the North musiktitel kostenlosen. Of the five experts, one
thought the younger Kim might succeed and one argued his lack of leadership
experience made it unlikely he would win the support of the ruling elites microsoft office windows 7 kostenlosen vollversion deutsch. They
agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law Jang Song-taek would prove a strong
rival for the younger Kim and would probably be tempted to challenge him herunterladen. Kim
Jong-il had used draconian controls and international aid to discourage coups
after having foiled three such attempts in the late 90s. China’s strategic
interests were fundamentally at odds with U.S.-ROK interests in North Korea download the settlers 7.
End Summary. Succession in Progress but Success in Doubt
Discussion Highlights: [...] The experts agreed that regime succession was
fully underway and that the North Korean people had accepted the process pdf dateien auf ipad herunterladen.
[...] The group agreed that Kim Jong-il’s brother-in-law and right-hand man
Jang Song-taek was spearheading the succession drive and would be a rival for
power once Kim Jong-un’s father died, but the group was split on the younger
Kim’s prospects for holding onto power tomcat 8 herunterladen. XXXX suggested it was unclearwhether
Jang would be content to control the younger Kim from behind the curtain, or
would challenge him directly for outright control herunterladen. [...] XXXX recalled the
tumultuous state of affairs in the ROK following the death of President Park
Chung Hee in 1979 and suggested the DPRK succession would be “100 times more
troublesome.” [...] XXXX opined that brutal repression and international aid
had been the secrets of Kim Jong-il’s ability to fend off challenges musik kostenlos auf pc deutsch. After
three separate coup attempts in the 90s, Kim Jong-il had implemented very strict
controls and sent a stern warning to would-be plotters by executing anyone who
had been even remotely involved in the plots wie kann man videos von youtube legal herunterladen. [...] The large-scale assistance
provided to the regime by the ROK, China, the U.S., Japan and others had been
intended in part to avoid a hard landing, and indeed had kept the regime afloat,
he said. XXXX suggested that North Korea had skillfully played Washington and
Beijing off one another. [...] The experts agreed that China’s obsession with DPRK
stability at all costs, was clearly and fundamentally at odds with U.S. and ROK
interests. Given a choice between reaching out to Seoul or Beijing, XXXX believed
that Pyongyang elites would reflexively look to China for support [...] the U.S.
stake in North Korea was minimal compared to that of China by virtue of its proximity
to the North. [...] Beijing was concerned about [...] a potential flood of
“economic migrants” and broader social unrest on its immediate border.

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